Syria

The country is under a comprehensive OFAC program: what is restricted is dealing with the jurisdiction itself, not only listed persons (174 SDN entries). At this level, "is it profitable" is secondary to "is it legal".

• ·Sanctions counsel before any negotiations: check whether an OFAC general licence covers your deal
• ·Ask your own bank directly whether it will process payments for this country: correspondents decline more often than regulators prohibit
• ·Assess secondary-sanctions exposure for the whole group, not just the local entity
• ·Document the sanctions analysis in writing: it is your defence in an audit

Deal economics: Even permitted operations get expensive: per-payment screening, bank risk premiums and legal support hit the cost base before the first sale.

Rule of law -1.81 on the WGI scale (−2.5 to +2.5), weak-courts threshold −0.8; worse than 97% of countries. Courts are statistically unreliable as a recovery route.

• ·First contracts: prepayment or a confirmed letter of credit
• ·An offshore arbitration clause (ICC, LCIA, SCC) plus counterparty assets the award can actually reach
• ·A local partner with a share of the result, not a commission
• ·A receivables cap per counterparty and stop-shipment on overdue payment

Deal economics: Credit terms here are an unsecured loan: price that risk into margin or move it into the cost of a letter of credit.

Regulatory quality -2.00 on the WGI scale (−2.5 to +2.5), unpredictability threshold −0.8; worse than 99% of countries. Rules and licence timelines change mid-process.

• ·Local regulatory counsel before the first filing
• ·Multiples of the stated licensing time in the launch plan
• ·Do not sign leases or hires against a date the licence does not yet contain
• ·Monitor rule changes as an ongoing process, not a one-off check

Deal economics: Every month waiting for a licence is cost without revenue: put it in the cash plan, not in optimism.

Control of corruption -1.70 on the WGI scale (−2.5 to +2.5), high-exposure threshold −0.8; worse than 99% of countries. Informal payments are part of the operating environment, not an exception.

• ·Anti-corruption policy and staff training before the first government contact
• ·No 'facilitators' through intermediaries: you answer for your agents' actions
• ·A log of every interaction with officials
• ·If the group touches the US or UK: FCPA/UKBA compliance is mandatory, not optional

Deal economics: FCPA fines are computed off group revenue, not the local branch: one 'facilitating' payment can cost more than this entire market.

Conflict intensity 68 of 100 on the UCDP log scale (active-violence threshold 45, watch threshold 20). This counts confirmed casualties over ~12 months, not news tone.

• ·Insurance with war-risk cover: standard policies exclude it
• ·An evacuation and communications protocol before the first trip
• ·No solo travel; routes through vetted regions
• ·Match the event map in the dossier against your own locations: violence clusters geographically

Deal economics: Security budget and insurance premiums are direct costs, and an insurer's refusal is a hidden stop-factor for hiring and travel.

INFORM Risk 7.4 of 10 (high band from 6.5, EU JRC): hazard exposure 7.9 combined with coping capacity 7.1 (higher is worse).

• ·A continuity plan per key node: what still runs when each one fails
• ·Buffer stock of critical items
• ·Duplicated logistics legs and suppliers
• ·A seasonal hazard map (floods, storms, droughts) in the operations calendar

Deal economics: Compare the cost of one day of downtime with the price of buffer stock: the buffer is almost always cheaper than a single supply stop.