Ethiopia

6 SDN entries target specific persons and companies, not the jurisdiction. The risk is measured not by the count but by the odds of finding a listed party in your counterparty's ownership chain.

• ·Screen every counterparty against SDN and the EU consolidated list before signing
• ·Check beneficial owners: under the OFAC 50% rule a listed party's half-share taints the company
• ·Sanctions representations and a termination right in the contract
• ·Re-screen on renewal and whenever the counterparty's ownership changes

Deal economics: Screening is a per-contract operating cost: cheap next to the fines, but it must live inside the sales process, not happen ad hoc.

Rule of law -1.05 on the WGI scale (−2.5 to +2.5), weak-courts threshold −0.8; worse than 81% of countries. Courts are statistically unreliable as a recovery route.

• ·First contracts: prepayment or a confirmed letter of credit
• ·An offshore arbitration clause (ICC, LCIA, SCC) plus counterparty assets the award can actually reach
• ·A local partner with a share of the result, not a commission
• ·A receivables cap per counterparty and stop-shipment on overdue payment

Deal economics: Credit terms here are an unsecured loan: price that risk into margin or move it into the cost of a letter of credit.

Regulatory quality -0.83 on the WGI scale (−2.5 to +2.5), unpredictability threshold −0.8; worse than 81% of countries. Rules and licence timelines change mid-process.

• ·Local regulatory counsel before the first filing
• ·Multiples of the stated licensing time in the launch plan
• ·Do not sign leases or hires against a date the licence does not yet contain
• ·Monitor rule changes as an ongoing process, not a one-off check

Deal economics: Every month waiting for a licence is cost without revenue: put it in the cash plan, not in optimism.

Control of corruption -0.44 on the WGI scale (−2.5 to +2.5), high-exposure threshold −0.8; worse than 62% of countries. Corruption shows up in procedures and intermediaries.

• ·Procurement and tenders only through transparent procedures
• ·Due diligence on intermediaries and agents before signing
• ·A second-signature rule on payments to state counterparties

Deal economics: The main hidden cost is not the bribe but the middleman: a fixer's commission always surfaces in the deal price.

Conflict intensity 73 of 100 on the UCDP log scale (active-violence threshold 45, watch threshold 20). This counts confirmed casualties over ~12 months, not news tone.

• ·Insurance with war-risk cover: standard policies exclude it
• ·An evacuation and communications protocol before the first trip
• ·No solo travel; routes through vetted regions
• ·Match the event map in the dossier against your own locations: violence clusters geographically

Deal economics: Security budget and insurance premiums are direct costs, and an insurer's refusal is a hidden stop-factor for hiring and travel.

Inflation 13.2% a year (World Bank, CPI), watch threshold 6%: above the comfort zone but manageable with contract tools.

• ·Indexation in long contracts
• ·Re-price more often than annually

Deal economics: Price periods longer than half a year start handing margin to inflation.

INFORM Risk 6.7 of 10 (high band from 6.5, EU JRC): hazard exposure 6.6 combined with coping capacity 6.9 (higher is worse).

• ·A continuity plan per key node: what still runs when each one fails
• ·Buffer stock of critical items
• ·Duplicated logistics legs and suppliers
• ·A seasonal hazard map (floods, storms, droughts) in the operations calendar

Deal economics: Compare the cost of one day of downtime with the price of buffer stock: the buffer is almost always cheaper than a single supply stop.